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the Post-Lisbon European Union
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A

Introduction

recent development in European law, less
heralded, but no less path-breaking than the
Treaty of Lisbon, was the ratification by
the European Union (EU) of its first human rights
treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Concluded as a
mixed agreement, the CRPD’s pioneering monitoring
mechanisms demand a high level of cooperation from
both the EU and its Member States. As the Treaty of
Lisbon fundamentally changed the frameworks by
which the European Union’s institutions operate,1
the EU (at the time, still the European Community)
formally participated in the negotiation of its first
international human rights treaty, the CRPD.2 But
the CRPD is a breakthrough in more ways than
one: the CRPD is the first United Nations human
rights treaty of the 21st century;3 it adopts a modern
“social model” of disability4 to explicitly recognize
the legal rights of the world’s largest marginalized
group,5 and in a break from its predecessor treaties,6 Signing of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007.
the CRPD contains novel provisions for implementa- Source: UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras
tion and monitoring,7 which portend a “progressive[]
reconfigur[ation] of the structure and process of
hoped, will be facilitated by these organizational centers. The
human rights oversight.”8
CRPD thus revolutionizes governments’ accountability to the
The CRPD provides for a treaty monitoring body (the
international community.
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) with an
This unusually activist stance from the UN on monitoring
international Conference of States Parties to monitor periodic
and
implementation has already grabbed the attention of acaState reports and to issue general recommendations, and it
demics
and policy-makers.10 In Europe, however, the questions
is supplemented by an Optional Protocol under which it can
posed by the CRPD go far deeper than merely how to more
receive individual or collective complaints.9 But these traditional
effectively translate treaty commitments into practice. The confunctions and institutions are underpinned by the requirement
clusion of the CRPD by both the EU and independently by its
to establish national “focal points” to facilitate and monitor
Member States as a mixed agreement generates questions about
steps taken by national and sub-national organs to fulfill the
the nature and future of European integration in the context of
Convention. This requirement — a first in international human
expanding EU authority and Member State rejection of formal
rights law — effectively charges a named government body
constitutionalism.11 How will the EU and Member States implewith oversight of CRPD compliance. The CRPD also requires
ment Convention duties in areas of shared competence? As the
cooperation with non-governmental organizations, which it is
Commission begins to implement a Code of Conduct under the
Convention,12 the practical effectiveness of the Convention within
the EU is at stake. Unless the current Code is revised to provide
* Jennifer W. Reiss is an associate attorney at White & Case LLP.
a concrete formula by which responsibility is divided and action
An earlier version of this paper was drafted while the author was an
taken, the CRPD will remain merely an empty promise of equal
associate of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New
rights for the disabled.
York University School of Law. LL.M., Cambridge University, 2010;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 2011; B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
2007. Many thanks to Fernanda Nicola, Daniela Caruso, and the
Brief staff for helpful comments on drafts, and also to Gráinne de
Búrca for advice on an earlier version this article.

This article proceeds in three primary parts: section one
briefly describes the substance of the CRPD, section two situates
its adoption in the context of European Union law, and section
18
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“[T]he CRPD is in essence a bill of rights for the disabled
community, reaffirming that impairments do not negate
fundamental protections accorded to persons by virtue
of their basic human dignity.”
three recounts and critiques the Code of Conduct which ostensibly
governs how the EU will fulfill its obligations.

participation in public life, among others — as well as more
specific concerns of the disabled community, including: accessibility, independent living, rehabilitation, and personal mobility. The last section of the convention includes articles dealing
with logistical issues: data collection, international cooperation,
reporting, and monitoring.14

Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities
Substantively, the CRPD obligates signatories to go beyond
the mere provision of non-discrimination legislation and address
the full panoply of civil, political, economic, and social rights
through the lens of disability. Underlying principles animating
the Convention explicitly include individual autonomy, and “full
and effective participation and inclusion in society.”13 Article 4
of the CRPD requires active and comprehensive state engagement in the human rights of disabled persons. This obligation
is then supplemented by specific provisions in Articles 5 to 30,
which touch on traditional elements of the human rights agenda
— de facto equality, the right to life, judicial access, freedom
from torture (or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment),
privacy, rights to home and family, education, employment, and

Without negating the applicability of pre-existing human
rights instruments,15 the CRPD is in essence a bill of rights for
the disabled community, reaffirming that impairments do not
negate fundamental protections accorded to persons by virtue
of their basic human dignity. In this sense, one could argue that
the CRPD should require little accommodation in national legal
systems. Presumably, signatories like the EU, which are already
active in protecting the human rights of its citizens, have generally applicable laws in place. The difficulty lies in the disabilityspecific provisions — the core of the Convention — which are
designed to mainstream disabled persons and address the existing
human rights gap engendered by their exclusion from the general
population. Governments will have
to review nearly the entire corpus
of existing law for lacunae ignoring the needs of the disabled, from
signage on buildings and making
public information available
through assistive technologies
to specialized training for social
services employees and the provision of cultural materials and
sports activities in accessible formats. Indeed, the CRPD would be
superfluous if it did not alert governments to, and compel action
on those dimensions of human
rights protection they have thus
far failed to address from a disability perspective. However, the
sheer pervasiveness of the neglect
the CRPD addresses makes its
implementation substantially
more complex than other human
rights instruments.

All-wheel minibus used for public transport in the mountain valleys of Switzerland, 2011.
Source: Flickr user Kecko
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Adoption by the European Union

experimenting with inventive modalities for managing shared
competences that may be importable into the mixed agreement
context.

Added to the immense task described above are the multiple
layers of responsibility and accountability in the EU’s supranational system — where Member States have exclusive legal
competences, the EU has exclusive legal competences, and there
is a vast interstitial space of shared competences — as well as
the notion of legal clarity becomes more than a desirable end of
CRPD obligations, but essential to its implementation.
In brief, powers — or competences — can be exclusive
or shared (whether internal to
the EU or in its external relations with non-member states).16
According to Article 2(2) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), in areas
of shared competence the Member
States are only free to act to the
extent that the EU has not done
so. There is also a lesser form of
“supplementary” competence for
the EU to support or coordinate
Member State actions, provided
for in Article 2(5) TFEU. It should
be noted that the TFEU explicitly
includes the principles of “sincere
cooperation” and “mutual respect”
in the exercise of delineated competences, meant to reinforce the
essentiality of loyalty between the
EU and the Member States for
effective action in a cooperative
federal structure.17

For example, Council regulations now require Commission
observation of bilateral air service agreements, and encourage
the acting State to include standardized clauses drafted by the
Commission in conjunction with the Member States.22 In multilateral agreements “disconnection” clauses have been added noting that EU law on point prevails
over the international agreement
inside the Union, but does not
affect individual Member State
obligations.23 Another option
is the so-called Open Method
of Coordination (OMC) a ‘soft
law’ mechanism which stresses
decentralized, voluntary, mutual
learning via the setting of guidelines, timetables, and benchmarks
for achieving generalized goals,
often announced by the European
Council, which are then translated into specific national policies tailored to circumstances in
Member States. The intention is
that civil society and stakeholders are involved in this debate
and initial policymaking. These
policies are then subject to peer
review with the objective of
exchange of best practices and
thus gradual harmonization of
EU objectives without resort to
legislative or regulatory dictates
in sensitive policy areas.24

“One must remember
that delineating powers
in the case of the CRPD
means so much more
than horse-trading in the
bland ‘Eurospeak’ of a
Brussels bureaucrat. It
directly translates into
political responsibility
and — more importantly
— accountability to fill
one of the last true gaps
in European human
rights law.”

Concluding treaties like the
CRPD as “mixed” agreements
— i.e. jointly by the EU and its
Member States — has been the
norm when some of the matters covered by the agreement
fall outside the EU’s competence,
or because in respect of matters
for which competence is shared,
the Member States have chosen
to act under their own powers
rather than through the Union.18
Mixed agreements are necessary
to maintain the practical effectiveness of a cooperative federalist system,19 but they are also politically useful given the
inherent volatility of this governance style.20 Thus far, mixed
agreements have tended to involve discrete issues, like humanitarian aid, nuclear safety, and participation in the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety.21 Because it does not impose a strict
competence structure on the Commission and Member States,
mixed agreements offer the space to experiment with creative
modes of governance — especially when dealing with convoluted shared competences. Indeed, the Union has already begun

With that context in mind,
appended to the Council Decision
concluding the CRPD on behalf of
the European Union is a declaration of the powers of the Union vis
à vis the Member States.25 Many
of the CRPD’s obligations clearly
engage shared and supplementary
Union competences, particularly
in terms of CRPD Articles 9 and
20 on accessibility and personal
mobility, respectively. Ostensibly then, this document should be
the foundation for any further exploration of dividing powers
under the Convention. Unfortunately, it is not very helpful. The
powers of the Union are very general ones, relatively apparent
from a plain reading of the CRPD. The EU specifies exclusive
competence regarding its own public administration and shared
or supplemental competence in areas where it is provided for in
the TFEU, such as transport, discrimination on the grounds of disability, employment and vocational training.26

The Decision does include an additional appendix to “illustrate” existing Union legislation relevant to matters covered by
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the Convention, including seventeen items on accessibility, nine
on employment and social inclusion, eight on mobility, five on
access to information, five on data collection, and three on relevant aspects of international cooperation. However, (1) this listing may or may not be comprehensive and (2) interested parties
are left to investigate each of the forty-seven acts independently
to assess the extent of the EU and Member States’ comparative
undertakings. Moreover, the document is somewhat biased in
emphasizing the EU as the predominant actor. Although it might
have been appropriate to include some discussion of what is
clearly Member State competence as a counter-point to elucidate
the declaration of the EU’s
competence, there is no
such explicit discussion of
what might be exclusively
the province of the Member
States.27

implementation provisions of the CRPD, the United Nations
has engaged itself in a quest for continued effectiveness for
the international human rights regime. In the Convention’s
Code of Conduct, the EU had a similar chance to innovate,
develop new governance mechanisms, and enhance its ability
to fulfill its growing responsibilities in the human rights field.
Unfortunately, the Code of Conduct leaves much to be desired.
The document is preoccupied foremost with management
within the UN monitoring context but not truly with the division of responsibilities between the levels of governance.
Coordination meetings may
be convened on the subject
of any type of competency
prior or concurrent to UN
committee meetings, with
referrals on subjects of either
shared or exclusive Union
competence to a Disability
High Level Group. In the
event of Member State
competence over a given
subject, “coordinated positions” may be expressed by
either the EU Presidency,
an appointed Member State,
or by mutual consent the
Commission, who will also
speak in cases of exclusive
Union competence.30 In
shared competence, determining who will make statements on behalf of the EU is
an issue of “the preponderance of the matter,” a term
which is left undefined.31
Only in the event of deadlock on shared competence combined
with a pressing UN deadline is there provision for anything
but the same vague standards suggested by the EU documents
concluding the CRPD. Disagreements are referred to relevant
Council Working Groups designated by the Presidency and as
a last resort, to the Permanent Representatives Committee, who
will vote on the matter in accordance with the EU voting rules
assigned to the subject.32

“If the EU is serious about
its obligations under the
Convention, the current Code
of Conduct is not enough.
The plight of the disabled is
not going to be ameliorated
by streamlined procedures in
New York or Geneva.”

Many of these instruments have as their legal
basis in Article 114 TFEU
— the European ‘commerce
clause’ empowering the EU
to adopt harmonizing legislation in support of the internal
market.28 This is noteworthy
because the article is subject to extensive qualifications pursuant to political
concerns of the Member
States, which further complicates the question of who
is responsible for attending to the needs of disabled
consumers. Comprehensive
implementation will clearly
take time, resources, and ultimately, political capital within the
Commission. When seen in that context, the opaquely announced
division of competences becomes somewhat understandable.
However, one must remember that delineating powers in the case
of the CRPD means so much more than horse-trading in the bland
‘Eurospeak’ of a Brussels bureaucrat. It directly translates into
political responsibility and — more importantly — accountability
to fill one of the last true gaps in European human rights law.
Delineating competences means that the paraplegic knows where
to turn when she is denied access to public transport, it means that
the schizophrenic can petition to be cared for by his family, rather
than locked in an institution, and it means that autistic children
can no longer be marginalized or excluded from a real education
as a burden to the public. There are palpable consequences of the
path the EU decides to take.

If the EU is serious about its obligations under the Convention,
the current Code of Conduct is not enough. The plight of the disabled is not going to be ameliorated by streamlined procedures
in New York or Geneva. A better Code would not skirt the issue
of competences, but instead establish precise circumstances
under which the procedures for managing competences are
triggered and initial steps are outlined to move from obligation
to legislation. And to do so, it would adopt a discursive focus:
establishing pathways for information sharing and consultation,
but couching it in the firmer legal approach adopted by the EU’s
existing coordinating Regulations.

The Code of Conduct
In late 2010, the Council, Commission, and Member States
adopted a Code of Conduct with the primary purpose of describing
the function of the Commission as the focal point for implementation of the CRPD (in accordance with Article 33(1)
of the Convention).29 With the inventive monitoring and

For example, the key provision in a revised Code should
stipulate that the entity to which an issue of compliance is first
presented — whether the Member States or the Commission
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“[T]he fulfillment of citizen-centered governance
depends in large part on the cooperative ethos and notion
of mutual responsibility suffusing Europe’s chosen style
of federalism. The EU’s institutions must collaborate.”
— shall notify all appropriate focal points33 either of (1) the
action proposed by that body to address compliance in accordance with an express competence or (2) the concern that
compliance would be better served by action at another level of
governance. In the latter case, a proposal or opinion on further
conduct should be appended. This procedure would have to have
some appropriate time limitation.

the probability of compliance with the substantive provisions, as
well as buttressing the establishment of the local focal points so
key to the Convention’s innovative approach.
A further delineation of areas of competence — complete
with existing affected legislation and proposed additional acts
in both the EU and Member States — is useful if the EU is serious about effectively implementing the CRPD. In other words,
without a dualist-style strict division of powers, the onus is on
the EU and Member State institutions to behave themselves: to
agree on the extent of the responsibilities on each side, ensure
that the network of responsibilities is comprehensive, and stand
by the agreed responsibilities. A precise declaration of competences keeps both sides honest. That said, it may not be realistic
to create a straight recital of competences when the legal impact
of the CRPD is so pervasive, but something more than the current Code is clearly warranted.

CRPD focal points of nations affected by the proposed
action can then craft a response to the notification. If there is
agreement between the Commission and the Member States
in competency or method, the notifying focal point would be
authorized to proceed. If there is disagreement, the initial notification would act as a binding agreement to enter into mutual
discussions on the issue. Efficiency and effectiveness would be
served by forcing participation in the cooperative procedure, so
neither the Commission nor the Member States can shirk difficult questions. It also provides a forum for information sharing
on better methods and unintended consequences. Discussions
could trigger notification to and response from the European
Parliament to increase democratic participation and the breadth
of expertise available.

Conclusion
The Treaty of Lisbon is part of an ongoing constitutional
process between the European Union and Member States.
Increasingly, those “two levels of government are [seen as]
complementary elements of one system” existing “in permanent
interdependency,” which places the interests of individual citizens — rather than the state — at the center of its constitutional
universe.37 Seen in that light, the concurrent advent of Lisbon
and the CRPD is powerful. As the international human rights
system continues to mature and recognize a fuller conception of
individual dignity, perhaps unconsciously, the European Union
is moving in a direction that aligns concrete political institutions
with that vision. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of citizen-centered
governance depends in large part on the cooperative ethos and
notion of mutual responsibility suffusing Europe’s chosen style
of federalism. The EU’s institutions must collaborate.

There should also be clarity in the procedures regarding what
would happen if negotiations deadlocked. The CRPD obligations are obviously ongoing, and thus to be a good global citizen, the EU could not just leave the issue unresolved, however
politically prudent that may be. The EU’s judicial cooperation
regulations34 seem to provide for a final resolution in favor
of the Commission in such cases by replacing the open-ended
supervision provided for by earlier laws.35 A fairer and more
definitive solution may be to provide for referral to the Court of
Justice of the European Union for an Advisory Opinion on the
Union powers in controversy after some extended time (such a
provision would also respond to a potential critique of lack of
judicial oversight, without necessarily encumbering innovation).
The conceivable existence of a permanent deadlock in negotiations between Member States and the Commission was a key
point that the Court of Justice left unresolved after the case of
Commission v. Sweden.36

This obligation is especially profound in external relations
agreements like the CRPD. In establishing the concept of “focal
points”, the UN has recognized that clarity of responsibility and
coordination of national action within international organizations
is key to effectiveness: mere general mandates and reporting
are insufficient to ensure accountability. Although Lisbon
improves coordination on external action with the new unitary
role of High Representative, a coordination problem remains
outside the area of common foreign and security policy.38
Legislating mutual consultation in the management of shared

Finally, to be prudent, a revised Code of Conduct would
include review and expiry provisions, with perhaps a five-year
limit and explicit provision to send the review report to the UN
CRPD Committee for consideration. If anything, such procedures should be welcomed at the United Nations as improving

22

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
competences — particularly in agreements like the CRPD where
responsibilities are difficult to specify outright — is one key element in the equation of deepening integration whilst respecting
difference. Respecting and celebrating differences is of course

the touchstone of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities itself, and that should be the ultimate end of crafting
its place in EU law.

Endnotes: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Post-Lisbon European Union
1

Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.5 (14 Aug. 2006). Other relevant UN
Studies and Reports are accessible at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/disability/documents.htm. For an overview of the
various monitoring mechanisms in the CRPD, see Michael Ashley
Stein & Janet E. Lord, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and
Future Potential, 32 Hum. Rts Q. 689 (2010).
8 Id. at 690.
9 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, G.A.Res. 61/106, UN GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp.
No.49, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106/Annex II, at 65 (13 Dec. 2006)
[entered into force 3 May 2008].
As of August 2011, the Optional Protocol has 90 signatories with
62 ratifications — not including the EU, although there is a pending
proposal to sign. See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision
Concerning the Conclusion by the EC of the CRPD, COM (2008)
530 final (Feb. 2008).
10 See, e.g., Stein & Lord, supra note 7; Presentation by Gerard
Quinn to the Parliament of New Zealand, 19 Feb. 2009, http://
www.odi.govt.nz/documents/convention/20090219-gerard-quinnaddress-comvoices-breakfast.doc (last visited Oct. 11, 2010);
European Disability Forum, EDF Contribution to the UNOHCHR
Thematic Study to Enhance Awareness on the Structure and Role
of National Mechanisms for the Implementation and Monitoring
of the CRPD (September 2009) www.def-feph.org (last visited Oct.
11, 2010).
11 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 23) 35. The
Commission is designated as the “focal point” for coordination
under the CRPD. Id., Art. 3. See Delia Ferri, The Conclusion of
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by
the EC/EU: Some Reflections from a “Constitutional” Perspective
(University of Catania Online Working Paper No. 4, 2010) available at http://www.lex.unict.it/cde/quadernieuropei/serie_speciale/
diversita_culturale.asp.
12 Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct between the
Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal
arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the
European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Doc. No. 16243/10 (Nov. 29,
2010) available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/
st16/st16243.en10.pdf [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
13 CRPD, supra note 3, Art. 3(a), (c).
14 For a more detailed analysis see Anna Lawson, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
New Era or False Dawn? 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Comm. 563,
590 et. seq. (2007).
15 CRPD, supra note 3, Art. 4(4).

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 Dec. 2007,
2007 OJ (C 303) 1. Further references will be made to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union [18 May
2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 13] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union [18 May 2008, 2008 OJ (C 115) 47] incorporating
the Lisbon Treaty changes [hereinafter TEU (AA) (‘as amended’)
and TFEU respectively]. Similarly, for clarity’s sake, this paper
adopts the post-Lisbon nomenclature; the ‘European Union’ (and
derivations thereof) will be substituted for reference to all precursor
organizations unless absolutely necessary.
2 See generally, Gráinne de Búrca, The European Union in the
Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention, 35 Eur. L. Rev. 174
(2010).
3 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
G.A.Res. 61/106, UN GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. No.49, UN Doc.
A/RES/61/106/Annex II, at 65 (13 December 2006) [entered into
force 3 May 2008; hereinafter CRPD]. As of August 2011 the
CRPD has 149 signatories with 103 ratifications; the EU and
all EU Member States have signed, and the EU ratified on 12
December 2010. See UN Enable, Convention and Optional Protocol
Signatures and Ratifications, http://www.un.org/disabilities/
countries.asp?navid=12&pid=166 (last visited 19 Aug. 2011).
4 For an overview of the social model of disability and its
contrast to the traditional medical model, see Michael Ashley Stein,
Disability Human Rights, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 75, 85-93 (2007).
5 Gerard Quinn, A Short Guide to the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 1 Eur. Y.B. Disability L.
89, 89-90 (2009).
6 These include, the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide
(1948), the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (both 1966), the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979), the
Convention against Torture (1984), the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (1989), the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
(1990) and the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006).
7 CRPD, supra note 3, Arts. 33-40. For a primer on traditional
monitoring systems for UN human rights treaties, and critiques
thereof see Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., The Future of
UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (2000); see also Off. UN
High Comm. for Hum. Rts [OHCHR], Expert Paper on Existing
Monitoring Mechanisms, Possible Relevant Improvements and
Possible Innovations, UN Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.4 (16 Jan.
2006); UN Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, National Institutional
Frameworks and Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN

Endnotes continued on page 75

23

